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Abstract
We study competition in two sided markets with common network externality rather
than with the standard inter-group e¤ects. This type of externality occurs when both
groups benet, possibly with di¤erent intensities, from an increase in the size of one
group and from a decrease in the size of the other. We explain why common externality
is relevant for the health and education sectors. We consider di¤erent remuneration
schemes on the provider side: pure salary, fee-for service or mixed payments. We
show that when the externality itself satises an homogeneity condition then platforms
prots and price structure have some specic properties. Our results reveal how the
rents coming from network externalities are shifted by platforms from one side to other,
according to the homogeneity degree. In the specic but realistic case where the common
network externality is homogeneous of degree zero, platformsprot do not depend on
the intensity of the (common) network externality. Prices are a¤ected but in such a
way that platforms only transfer rents from consumers to providers. We show that a
fee-for service leads to a lower remuneration for providers than a at salary scheme.
This, in turn, results in a lower prices level so that prots are the same under both
regimes. When platforms combine both remuneration schemes on the providersside,
there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria, parametrized by one of the three
prices. Nevertheless, platformsprots are the same in of all these equilibria.
Jel codes: D42, L11, L12.
Keywords: Two-Sided markets, Common Network Externality, Health, Education.
1 Introduction
The theory of two-sided markets has been developed in recent years to investigate market
structures in which two groups of agents interact via platforms; see for instance Rochet
and Tirole (2006). The central theme of this literature is the presence of network
externalities, which occur when the benet from joining a platform for individuals of
a given group depends on the size of membership (and/or usage) of the other group.
Prominent examples of sectors in which such inter-group externalities occur range from
credit cards, media and software to dating clubs.
We consider a two-sided market with an externality of a di¤erent nature. We shall
refer to it as a common network externality. It occurs when externalities can be
summed up by a (quality) index that positively a¤ects the utility of both groups. More
precisely, both groups benet, possibly with di¤erent intensities, from an increase in the
size of one group and from a decrease in the size of the other. Such externalities are
relevant in a number of two-sided markets. For instance, in the health care sector,
hospitals compete for patients on one side and for providers on the other side (see
Pezzino and Pignatoro, 2008). It is a conventional assumption that the quality of
health care depends on the providersworkload. This is documented, for instance, by
Tarnow-Mordi et al. (2000) who use UK data to show that variations in mortality can
be explained in part by excess workload in the intensive care unit. Accordingly, health
care quality is frequently related to the provider/patient ratio; see Mc Gillis Hall (2004).
In other words, it increases when the number of health care professionals increases (for
a given number of patients) but decreases when the number of patients increases (for a
given number of providers). Both sides benet from a higher quality albeit for di¤erent
reasons and possibly with di¤erent intensity. This is quite obvious on the patients
side, where one can expect a higher quality to translate into a improvement in patients
health state (or at the very least into a reduction in waiting lines for appointments,
etc...). Physicians benet from a higher quality through a reduction in their workload,1
1See for instance Fergusson-Paré (2004) for the nursing workload. Gri¢ n and Swan (2006) also nd
a strong relationship between nursesworkload and quality of health care.
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or indirectly, through their altruism (or simply job satisfaction).2
Similar issues may arise in the education sector. Colleges or universities compete
for students on one side and for professors on the other side. The quality of education
depends on the pupil/teacher ratio and one can expect both sides to benet from a
higher quality. This is conrmed by surveys in which parents and teachers declare that
they prefer a smaller class size (Mueller et al., 1988). Furthermore, lower pupil/teacher
ratios are associated with higher test scores for the children (see for instance Angrist
and Lavy, 1999) and a smaller class size tends to increase average future earnings (Card
and Krueger, 1992). On the other side, teachers enjoy an improved job satisfaction and
a lower workload as the pupil/teacher ratio decreases.3
In this paper, we revisit the Armstrongs framework with a common network ex-
ternality rather than with the standard inter-group e¤ects. Two for-prot platforms
compete in prices for singlehoming agents, i.e. customers and providers, located on two
distinct Hotellings lines.4 The common externality enters the preferences of both groups
as a quality parameter. Each group values the common externality with (possibly) dif-
ferent intensities but the underlying notion of quality that matters (the functional form
that species quality) is the same for both groups. We consider two alternative schemes
for the payment of providers: salary on the one hand, and fee-for-service on the other
hand. We focus on the symmetric equilibrium and show that when the externality is
specied by an homogeneous function, price structure and platformsprot present some
special features. We show that when providers receive a salary, network externalities
a¤ect prices in a cumulative way: the price on one side of the market depends on the
sum of the externality terms on both sides of the market. Second, the e¤ect on one sides
price is, partially or entirely, shifted to the other side of the market. The extend of this
shifting depends on the sign of the homogeneity degree of the common network exter-
2See, e.g., Choné and Ma (2010).
3Buckingham (2003) nds that a reduction of class size slightly increases achievment, but also in-
creases teachers work conditions by lightening their workload and easing classroom managment.
4 In the education and health sectors, for-prot rms may also compete with non-prot organizations.
To understand the implications of our common network externalities within the simplest possible setting,
we focus on symmetric equilibria with for-prot rms. The study of mixed markets is a naturel extension
of our analysis.
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nality (or more precisely, the degree of homogeneity of the function that relates quality
to the membership on both sides). Third, under both payment schemes, competition in-
tensity is also a¤ected by this homogeneity degree. Specically, the homogeneity degree
determines the impact of the common network externality on the platformsprots.
Our results have particularly strong implication for the education and health sectors,
where quality is known to mainly depend on consumer/provider ratio i.e., the common
externality is homogeneous of degree zero. In this case, platformsprots do not de-
pend on the intensity of the (common) network externalities. This property is in sharp
contrast to the results obtained so far in the two-sided market literature. One of the
major ndings which has been reiterated in many settings is that the presence of net-
work externalities in a two-sided market structure increases the intensity of competition
when the externality is positive (and decreases it when the externality is negative).5
We show that in a context of common network externality of degree zero, this is not
the case. Under this assumption, prices are a¤ected by the externality but in such a
way that platforms only transfer rents from one group to the other. Roughly speaking,
some rents due to the common network externality are extracted from the consumers
side and transferred to providers. Furthermore, we show that for nonzero degrees
of homogeneity, the conventional result can be generalized in an intuitively appealing
way. When the degree of homogeneity of the common network externality is positive,
platformsprots decrease in the externality parameters. We can think about this case
as that where the global impact of the externality is positive. A negative degree of
homogeneity yields exactly the opposite result.
While these results hold under both types of payment schemes, price remuneration
levels di¤er. Specically, prices and payment per provider are lower under fee-for-
service than under salary schemes. As far as prots are concerned these two e¤ects
exactly cancel out so that prots are the same for the two payment schemes. These
results are particularly instructive for the health care sector where both schemes are
used in practice. Most of the literature on the design of payment schemes in the health
sector focuses on incentives for cost reduction within a principal-agent framework. These
5See, e.g., Armstrong (2006).
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studies typically advocate that at payment schemes give better incentives to providers
than fee-for-service.6 We show that when competitive strategies are accounted for, fee-
for-service schemes may appear in a more positive light. In particular, when hospitals
compete in a two-sided environment, i.e. for patients and providers, a fee-for-service
scheme allows to reduce the patientsbill.
Finally, we analyze the case where platforms combine both remuneration schemes
on the providersside. As expected, and in line with Armstrongs ndings, we show that
there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria, parametrized by one of the three prices.
More precisely, the price charged on the customersside and the salary paid to providers
are reduced according to the fee-for-service received by providers. Consequently, for a
given level of quality obtained in (symmetric) equilibrium, patientswelfare increases as
a larger share of the providersremuneration is paid through a fee-for service schemes.
Platforms prots, on the other hand, are the same in all symmetric equilibria. An
interpretation of this result is that the intensity of the competition is independent of
the weights put on both types of payments within the providersremuneration scheme.
Before proceeding, let us have a closer look at the relationship of our paper to the
existing literature. As pointed out by Rochet and Tirole (2003), the two-sided literature
is at the intersection between multi-product pricing and network theories. The main
focus of this paper lies on the second aspect. Several types of network externalities have
been analyzed in the two-sided markets literature. The standard one is the inter-group
network externality which we have mentioned above. It has also been pointed out that
negative intra-group network externalitycan occur in equilibrium. This may be the
case when members of a given group compete with each other. An additional member on
one side then not only creates a positive inter-group externality but, at the same time, it
can adversely a¤ect welfare of the other members of the considered group.7 For instance,
in Bardey and Rochet (2010), health plans compete for policyholders on one side and
for physicians on the other side. When a health plan enlists more physicians, this
directly increases welfare of its policyholders. However, at the same time, it may tend
6For instance, Gaynor and Pauly (1990) show this result within a theoretical model. Their structural
estimations conrm that incentives a¤ect the quantity of medical services that are delivered.
7Most of time, this e¤ect occurs because it increases the number of competitors.
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to attract riskier policyholders who place a higher value on the diversity of physicians.
The induced adverse selection problem can be seen as a negative intra-group network
externalitythat occurs on the policyholdersside.
These intra-group e¤ects are of course strictly speaking not externalities as they
operate through the price system. However, some recent papers have also considered
proper negative intra-group network externalities. Belleamme and Toulemonde (2007)
develop a model where agents value positively the presence of members of the other
group, but may value negatively members of their own group. For instance, both ad-
vertisers and consumers benet from a large representation of the other group (positive
inter-brand externality) but advertisers are in competition for eyeballs (negative intra-
brand externality). Kurucu (2008) analyses a matching problem in which agents on
one side prefers more agents on the other side but less on their own side. Such a
conguration of externalities can occur for matrimonial or job matching agencies.
Our paper is inspired by Belleamme and Toulemonde (2007) and Kurucu (2008)
from whom we borrow the presence of negative intra- and positive inter-groups network
externalities. However, we combine the same ingredients in a di¤erent way. In our
framework, an additional consumer generates a negative intra-group and a positive inter-
group network externality. Roughly speaking, the utility of a consumer is increasing
in the number of providers and is decreasing in the number of the other consumers
a¢ liated with the same platform. On the providersside, network externalities work
on the opposite direction. In other words, the utility of a provider is increasing in
the number of providers a¢ liated to the same platform (positive intra-group network
externality), while it is decreasing in the number of consumers present on the other side
(negative inter-group network externality). The combination of these two characteristics
leads to our concept of common network externalities: both groups benet, possibly with
di¤erent intensities, from an increase in the size of one group and from a decrease in
the size of the other group.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the model. In Section 3,
we determine the equilibrium and study its properties when providers are remunerated
via salaries. We extend the equilibrium analysis to the case in which providers are
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remunerated through a fee-for-service in Section 4, while both remuneration schemes
are combined in Section 5. Finally, some illustrations are provided in Section 6.
2 The model
Consider two platforms j = f1; 2g located at both endpoints of the Hotellings segment.
They compete for two groups of agents i = fA;Bg of mass 1 (group A) andm (group B)
respectively. Agents of each group are uniformly distributed over an interval of length
1. The utilities of both groups exhibit quadratic transportation costs with parameters
tA and tB respectively. For the sake of simplicity, we shall refer to members of group
A as customerswhile group B individuals are considered as providers. We shall
return to this interpretation later.
The utility of a group A individual (a customer), located at z, who patronizes
platform j (consumes one unit of its product) is given by
V = V + qj   Pj   tA (z   xj)2 ;
where Pj denotes platform js price, while  measures the preference intensity for a
quality qj . An individual of group B (a provider), located at y, who works (a given
number of hours) for platform j has utility
U = U + qj + Tj   tB (y   xj)2 ;
where  is the preference for quality qj , while Tj denotes the transfer paid by platform
j to its providers. Without loss of generality, reservation utilities are equal to zero.
Consequently, the constants V and U denote the gross utility on sides A and B; they
are assumed to be su¢ ciently large to ensure full coverage on both sides of the market.
Platforms maximize prots and simultaneously set their price/transfer vectors (Pj ; Tj),
j = 1; 2:
2.1 Network externalities
Let nij denote the share of type i = A;B individuals a¢ liated with platform j = 1; 2,
while N ij denotes the number of a¢ liates. With our normalizations we have N
A
j = n
A
j
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and NBj = mn
B
j : The quality o¤ered by platform j depends on its number of a¢ liates
in both groups and is determined by
qj = f(N
A
j ; N
B
j ) = f
 
nAj ;mn
B
j

:
This function species what we refer to as a common network externalityand which
is dened as follows.
Denition 1 A common network externality, described by the function qj = f(NAj ; N
B
j );
occurs when both sides value, possibly with di¤erent intensities, the same network ex-
ternality.
An important feature of this denition is that the functional form f is the same
on both sides. In other words, customers and providers agree on the ranking of quality
levels. However, the taste for quality (measured by  and ) can di¤er between customers
and providers. Since A refers to the consumer side, while index B is used for the provider
side we assume @f=@NAi < 0 and @f=@N
B
i > 0.
8
Prominent examples of such a common externality can be found in the health care
and education markets. In the hospital sector, for instance, on can think of nAj as
representing the number of patients while mnBj stands for the number of physicians.
Alternatively, nAj can be interpreted as the number of students while mn
B
j stands for
the number of teachers. In both of these cases, one would expect quality to increase
with mnBj and to decrease with n
A
j . A formulation often used in the literature on
education and health is given by qj =

lmnBj =n
A
J

, where l and  are positive con-
stants. With this specication the quality o¤ered by a hospital or a university depends
upon provider/patient or teacher/student ratio, and the function f is homogenous of
degree 0.9 More generally, one can assume that the function specifying the quality is
8While this assumption reects the spirit of our denition of the common network externality, it
is of no relevance to our formal analysis. Specically, Propositions 1, 2 and 3 do not rely on this
assumption. However, the assumption is important for the interpretation of our results (and their
economic content). It is also key to understanding the di¤erence between our framework and Kurucu
(2008) and Belleamme and Toulemonde (2007). In our setting, the utility functions on both sides,
V A(NA; NB) and UB(NA; NB) are both decreasing in NA and increasing in NB . In their framework
(but with our notations), V A(NA; NB) is increasing in NB but decreasing in NA while UB(NA; NB) is
increasing in NA but decreasing in NB .
9Krueger (2003) provides a cost-benet analysis of class size reduction. He shows that the internal
rate of return of a class size reduction from 22 to 15 students is around 6%.
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homogenous of degree k, which may or may not be positive. For instance when quality
is specied by
qj =
 
NBj

=
 
NAJ

; (1)
f is homogenous of degree    .
Using subscripts to denote the derivatives of f with respect to its rst and second
arguments (NAj and N
B
j respectively) and applying Eulers law yields the following
property.
Property 1 When a common network externality is homogenous of degree k then
NAj fA(N
A
j ; N
B
j ) +N
B
j fB(N
A
j ; N
B
j ) = kf(N
A
j ; N
B
j ).
We do not impose this assumption when determining the equilibrium in the next
section. However, it will turn out that the equilibrium has specic properties when the
common externality is homogenous of degree k. We shall focus more particularly on the
realistic case k = 0 which has some strong implications.
2.2 Demand functions
On group As side, the marginal consumer indi¤erent between two platforms is deter-
mined by
~z =
1
2
+
1
2tA
[ (q1   q2)  (P1   P2)] ;
while in group B, the marginal provider is given by
~y =
1
2
+
1
2tB
[ (q1   q2) + (T1   T2)] :
As both sides are fully covered, demand levels are equivalent to market shares. On side
A, we have nA1 = ~z and n
A
2 = 1  ~z, while on side B, nB1 = ~y and nB2 = (1  ~y). Dening
the quality di¤erential between platforms as
g
 
nA1 ;mn
B
1

= f
 
nA1 ;mn
B
1
  f  1  nA1 ;m(1  nB1 ) = q1   q2;
the demand functions are determined by the following system of implicit equations
nA1 =
1
2
+
1
2tA

g
 
nA1 ;mn
B
1
  (P1   P2) ; (2)
nB1 =
1
2
+
1
2tB

g
 
nA1 ;mn
B
1

+ (T1   T2)

: (3)
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In practice, the transfer Tj can take di¤erent forms. In the education sector, schools
usually pay a salary to their teachers. In the health care sector, fee-for-service schemes
were traditionally predominant. However, more recently salary contracts have become
increasingly popular; see Cutler and Zeckhauser (2000). Formally, the remuneration of
a provider a¢ liated with platform j is an a¢ ne function of NAj =N
B
j (the number of
patients per provider) where wj represents the xed remuneration (or salary), while cj
denotes the fee-for-service10
Tj = wj + cj
NAj
NBj
= wj + cj
nAj
mnBj
: (4)
We successively consider the two types of remuneration systems, namely a pure wage
scheme (wj > 0 and cj = 0) in Section (3) and a fee-for-service plan (wj = 0 and
cj > 0) in Section (4). Both schemes are combined in section (5).
Let  = (; ; tA; tB;m) denote the vector of exogenous parameters. Equations
(2)(3) dene the demand levels of platform 1,
nA1 (P1; P2; w1; w2; c1; c2; ) and n
B
1 (P1; P2; w1; w2; c1; c2; );
as functions of both platformsprice/wage/fee-for-service vectors and of the exogenous
variables.11 With full market coverage on both sides, demand levels of platform 2 are
then also fully determined and given by nA2 = 1  nA1 and nB2 = 1  nB1 .
Substituting (4) in (2) and (3), totally di¤erentiating the demand expressions, rear-
10The fee-for-service payment di¤ers from the usage or transaction fee usually considered in
the two-sided market literature. In the traditional specication, the price paid by one group is solely
an a¢ ne function of the number of agents in the other group (see e.g., Rochet and Tirole, 2003 and
Armstrong, 2006).
11We assume throughout the paper that demands are well dened and unique for any price levels.
When qj = mnBj  nAj , it is straightforward that demands are uniquely dened. Appendix A shows that
it is also the case when qj =
 
mnBj =n
A
J

.
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ranging and solving yields
dnA1
dP1
=
1
j	j

  1
2tA

1  1
2tB

mgB   4c1
m

; (5)
dnB1
dP1
=
1
j	j

  1
4tBtA

gA +
4c1
m

; (6)
dnA1
dw1
=
1
j	j

mgB
4tBtA

; (7)
dnB1
dw1
=
1
j	j

1
2tB

1  gA
2tA

; (8)
dnA1
dc1
=
1
j	j

gB
4tBtA

=
1
m
dnA1
dw1
; (9)
dnB1
dc1
=
1
j	j

1
2mtB

1  gA
2tA

=
1
m
dnB1
dw1
(10)
where gA = @g=@NA1 , gB = @g=@N
B
1 and
	 = 1  
2tB
mgB   
2tA
gA +
2c
mtB

1   (gA +mgB)
2tA

:
These properties are used in the next sections to determine the market equilibrium.
3 Market equilibrium with salary schemes
In this section, we assume that the transfers paid by platform j to its providers is a
salary wj (which does not depend on the number of patients) and set cj = 0. We
rst determine the price equilibrium and then study the properties of the corresponding
allocation. Platform 1 maximizes its prot with respect to P1 and w1 and solves
max
P1;w1
1 = P1n
A
1 (P1; P2; w1; w2; ) mw1nB1 (P1; P2; w1; w2; ) :
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The rst-order conditions are given by12
@1
@P1
= nA1 + P1
@nA1
@P1
 mw1@n
B
1
@P1
= 0; (11)
@1
@w1
=  mw1@n
B
1
@w1
 mnB1 + P1
@nA1
@w1
= 0: (12)
The rst two terms of equations (11) and (12) represent the traditional marginal in-
come tradeo¤, while the third terms capture the two-sided market feature. Specically,
an increase in the price charged on one side of the market also a¤ects the demand
on the other side. Equations (11) and (12) determine platform 1s best-reply func-
tions: P1 = eP1 (P2; w2; ) and w1 = ew1 (P2; w2; ). Platform 2s best-reply functions
P2 = eP2 (P1; w1; ) and w2 = ew2 (P1; w1; ) can be determined in a similar way by
the maximization of 2. Solving these best-reply functions yields the Nash equilibrium
[(P 1 ; w1) ; (P 2 ; w2)].
In the remainder of the paper, we concentrate on symmetric equilibria in which
both platforms charge the same prices, pay the same wages and equally split the market
on both sides (nA1 = n
A
2 = 1=2 and n
B
1 = n
B
2 = 1=2) so that quality levels are also
identical (g = 0). To determine the symmetric equilibrium we solve (11) and (12).
The derivatives of nA1 and n
B
1 that appear in these expressions are given by equations
(5)(8); with nA1 = 1=2; n
B
1 = 1=2 and c1 = c2 = 0; they are all well determined and
the problem reduces to the solution of a system of linear equations.13
Using the Cramers rule, we obtain
P1 =
1
2
h
@nB1
@w1
+m
@nB1
@P1
i
D
; w1 =
1
2
h
m
@nA1
@P1
+
@nA1
@w1
i
mD
; (13)
12 In two-sided market models, second-order condition are usually quite complex. With our general
specication of externality this problem can only be reinforced. To establish a link with the conditions
stated in Armstrong (2006), let us consider the linear case where quality is given by qj = mnBj   nAj .
The second-order conditions for this specication are derived in Appendix B. They are shown to be
satised i¤
(2tB   m) (2tA + )m
4
[   ]2 :
As in Armstrong (2006), this condition implies that transportation costs are su¢ ciently high with
respect to the externality parameters. In Section 6, we present a numerical example for the case where
qj = mn
B
j =n
A
j and show that the second-order conditions are satised.
13The derivates depend on nA1 and n
B
1 (which are by denition set at 1=2) but not directly on P1
and w1. The underlying reason for this simplication is that for the determination of demands only
di¤erences in prices and wages matter; see expressions (2)(3).
11
where
D =

 @n
A
1
@P1
@nB1
@w1
+
@nA1
@w1
@nB1
@P1

: (14)
Substituting (5)(8) and rearranging yields
1
2

@nB1
@w1
+m
@nB1
@P1

=
1
2

2tA   gA   mgA
4tAtB

; (15)
1
2

m
@nA1
@P1
+
@nA1
@w1

=
1
2
 2tB + mgB + gB
4tAtB

; (16)
D =
1
4tAtB

1  2tBmgB  

2tA
gA
 ; (17)
where gA and gB are evaluated at (1=2;m=2): Substituting (15)(17) into (13), simpli-
fying and dening gA = gA(1=2;m=2) and g

B = gB(1=2;m=2) establishes the following
proposition:
Proposition 1 When providers receive a salary, symmetric equilibrium prices are given
by
P j = tA  
1
2
( +m) gA; (18)
wj =  tB +
1
2
( +m) gB; 8j = 1; 2: (19)
Observe that this proposition provides a closed form solution with explicit expression
for the equilibrium prices. To interpret these expressions recall that per our assumption
on f , we have gA < 0 and g

B > 0. As usual, on both sides, platforms take advantage of
transportation costs to increase their mark-up. Network externalities, on the other hand,
a¤ect prices in a more interesting way. Because of their specic nature i.e. common
externality, their impact is cumulative, as is reected by the factor ( +m) in the
second term. In other words, network externalities are charged on the consumersside,
which generates the negative component of the CNE, and are transferred to providers,
who generate the positive element of the CNE.
Using (18) and (19) we can now express equilibrium prots as
j =
1
2
 
P j  mwj

=
1
2
(tA +mtB)  1
4
( +m) (mgB + g

A) : (20)
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Di¤erentiation with respect to the network externalities parameters gives
@j
@
= m
@j
@
=  1
4
(mgB + g

A) : (21)
Equation (21) establishes the following proposition.
Proposition 2 When providers receive a salary, the impact of individual valuations of
quality  and  on (symmetric) equilibrium prots is described by
m
@j
@
=
@j
@
S 0 if and only if   gA S mgB, 8j = 1; 2:
Proposition 2 shows that the impact of the externality (or, more precisely of the
relevant preference parameters) on prots depend on the relative strength of the exter-
nalities created by the membership on the two sides. To interpret this proposition, we
shall concentrate on the case where the common externality is homogenous of degree k.
According to Property 1 we then have NB1 fA +N
A
1 fA = kf . Moreover, at a symmetric
equilibrium, we have:
gA = 2fA;
gB = 2fB;
so that
mgB + g

A = 4kf

1
2
;
m
2

:
Proposition 3 Assume that providers receive a salary. When f is homogenous of
degree k the symmetric equilibrium implies mgB + g

A = 4kf
 
1
2 ;
m
2

, so that
sign

@j
@

= sign

@j
@

=  sign (k) ; j = 1; 2: (22)
Proposition 1 has shown that network externalities have a cumulative e¤ect on
prices. Proposition 3 shows how prots and competition intensity are a¤ected. When
the degree of homogeneity of the common network externality is positive, platforms
prot decrease in the externalitys parameters. In other words, the common network
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externality increases the competition intensity between platforms. This outcome occurs
because in this case, platforms have to pay a higher relative price wj/P

j on providers
side. Recall that we have a positive externality created by one side and a negative
externality generated by the other side. We can think about the case of k > 0 as
that where the global impact of the network externalities is positive. In other words,
if we increase membership on both sides in the same proportion, f (and thus quality)
increases. From that perspective we can think of our nding as a generalization of the
conventional result in the literature (relating prots and intensity of competition to the
sign of the externality).
When k < 0; on the other hand, we have a negative global externality which brings
about extra prots for the platforms. The wage paid to providers continues to increase
in the network externality parameters. However, this increased cost is now more than
fully shifted to the consumers. This is because quality is more sensitive to the number
of consumersand recall that quality decreases with the number of consumers. Conse-
quently, the common network externality tends to reduce the intensity of competition
on the consumersside. The rms are then able to extract more extra rents from the
consumers than they have to concede to the providers.
Finally, let us consider the special case in which the homogeneity degree is equal to
0 i.e. k = 0.
Corollary 1 For a symmetric equilibrium under salary schemes, 8j = 1; 2 with f ho-
mogenous of degree 0 we have mgB + g

A = 0, so that
@j
@
=
@j
@
= 0:
In that case, the intensity of preferences for quality (and thus the intensity of the
externality) has no impact on equilibrium prots. Specically, prot levels are the same
when the externality does not matter at all (in which case  =  = 0) as when one or
both of these parameters are positive. In other words, a common network externality
that is homogenous of degree zero, has no impact on the intensity of competition which
is in stark contrast with conventional results obtained in the two-sided market litera-
ture (for alternative forms of externalities). The expressions for the prices (18) and (19)
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make it clear why this result emerges. Assuming gB > 0 (providers produce a positive
externality) the externality in itself (or an increase in its valuation on either side) in-
creases rentson the providers side: wages are increased. However, this increase in
wages has no impact on prots because it is entirely shifted to consumers: the price
increase exactly matches the increase in wages.
4 Market equilibrium with fee-for-service schemes
We now consider the same market structure except that providers receive a fee-for-
service. Each provider of platform j = 1; 2 now receives a payment that is proportional
to his number of patients. Setting wj = 0 for j = 1; 2, platform 1 maximizes its prot
with respect to P1 and c1 and solves
max
P1;c1
1 = P1n
A
1 (P1; P2; c1; c2; ) mc1nB1 (P1; P2; c1; c2; )
nA1
mnB1
= nA1 (P1; P2; c1; c2; ) (P1   c1) : (23)
The rst-order conditions are given by14
@1
@P1
= nA1 +
@nA1
@P1
(P1   c1) = 0; (24)
@1
@c1
=  nA1 +
@nA1
@c1
(P1   c1) = 0: (25)
Substituting (5) and (9) where w1 = w2 = 0 into the rst-order conditions, rearranging
and solving establishes the following proposition.
Proposition 4 When providers are remunerated via fee-for service, symmetric equilib-
rium prices are given by
P j =
mtB
2
+ tA  

2gA +mgB
4

( + m) ; (26)
cj =  
mtB
2
+
mgB (m+ )
4
: (27)
It is worth noticing that cj is exactly equal to w

j= (2m), that is one half of the
fee-for-service implied by the equilibrium level of w in the salary game. In other words,
14Second order conditions are much more complex in this case and are left in appendix B2.
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when platforms compete in fee-for-service levels rather than in salaries their providers
equilibrium compensation is cut in half. To understand why fee-for-service leads to lower
compensations, let us start from the equilibrium salary w. By denition, this salary
level is such that no platform can gain by decreasing its salary given the salary o¤ered
by the other platform. Now, when fee-for-service is the strategic variable, a decrease in
a say c1 induces (for a given level of c2) a reduction in compensation o¤ered by platform
2 (because some providers move to platform 2). This implies that a reduction in c1
(given c2) is benecial, even though a reduction in w1 (given w2) is not. Interestingly,
the price level is also smaller with the fee-for-service scheme. To see this, combining (26)
and (18) to obtain P j = P

j   (m=2)w. Intuitively, we can once again start from the
equilibrium under salary schemes. By denition, platform 1 cannot gain by decreasing
its price given P2 and w2. In the fee-for-service case, a reduction in P1 brings about a
reduction in the compensation (per provider) paid by platform 2 (because some patients
more from platform 2 to platform 1). This in turn mitigates the negative e¤ects of a
decrease in the price and implies that a unilateral price decrease is benecial when c2 is
held constant even though it was not benecial when w2 was constant. Theses results
are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 5 We have P j < P

j and mc

j < w

j . Consequently, customers pay a
lower price and providers are less remunerated under a fee-for-service scheme than under
a salary scheme.
The heath economics literature has extensively dealt with the relative merits of
payment schemes and specically their incentive properties. A point that is often made
is that at payment schemes have the advantage of providing stronger incentives for cost
reduction.15 In our setting, cost reduction incentives are ignored and we focus instead
on strategic aspects. Interestingly, we nd that the at compensation scheme (salary)
now implies higher payments to provider and thus higher costs.
While providerscompensation and prices decrease the impact on prots is not a
priori clear. Substituting (26) and (27) into (23) and using (20) yield
15See, for instance, Gosden et al. (1999) for a review of the literature on the remuneration of health
care providers.
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j = 

j =
mtB + tA
2
  ( + m) (gA +mgB)
4
;8j = 1; 2:
In words, equilibrium prots are the same under fee-for-service as under salary schemes!
This establishes the following proposition.
Proposition 6 We have j = 

j so that equilibrium prots are the same under fee-
for-service as under salary schemes. Consequently, Propositions 2 and 3 as well as
Corollary 1 obtained with salary schemes continue to hold under fee-for-service.
To sum-up, while prices and provider payments depend on the type of remuneration
scheme, our results pertaining to the impact of the common network externality on
prots continue to hold. The next section shows that this result remains true when the
two remuneration schemes are combined.
5 Mixed remuneration schemes for providers
In this section, we consider that platforms can combine salary and fee-for-service. This
situation is particularly interesting to analyze the hospitals competition where it is
common that they use both schemes on the providersside. Platforms maximize prots
and simultaneously set their price/remuneration vectors (Pj ; wj ; cj), j = 1; 2: Without
loss of generality, we still concentrate on platform 1s program which is stated as
max
P1;w1;c1
1 = n
A
1 (P1; P2; w1; w2; c1; c2; ) (P1   c1) mw1nB1 (P1; P2; w1; w2; c1; c2; ) :
(28)
The rst-order conditions are given by
@1
@P1
= nA1 +
@nA1
@P1
(P1   c1) mw1@n
B
1
@P1
= 0; (29)
@1
@w1
=  mw1@n
B
1
@w1
 mnB1 + (P1   c1)
@nA1
@w1
= 0; (30)
@1
@c1
=  nA1 +
@nA1
@c1
(P1   c1) mw1@n
B
1
@c1
= 0: (31)
From these expressions we obtain the following proposition:
17
Proposition 7 (i) When platforms compete on the providersside in a¢ ne remuner-
ation schemes, as dened by (4), the system of rst-order conditions has an innity of
symmetric solutions.
(ii) At a symmetric equilibrium, the price structure can be written as
w1 =  tB +

(m+ ) gB
2
  2c

1
m

; (32)
P 1 = tA  
(m+ ) gA
2
  c1 ; (33)
where c1 is set arbitrarily.
Proof. At a symmetric solution, nA1 = n
B
1 = 1=2. Substituting (7)(10) into (30)
and (31) and rearranging yields
@1
@w1
= m
@1
@c1
;
so that the system of rst-order conditions is redundant. This establishes part (i) as
long as the system has at least one solution. Such a solution is given in part (ii). It
is obtained by combining (29) and (30), using the properties of the demand functions,
(5)(8), and solving the system of linear equations so obtained.
Observe that since gA and gB are evaluated at nA1 = n
B
1 = 1=2, equations (32) and
(33) give a closed form solution for salaries and prices. Part (i) of Proposition 7 is
similar to a result obtained by Armstrong (2006), albeit for a di¤erent specication of
externalities and tari¤s. He shows that when platforms use two-part tari¤s on one side,
there is a continuum of symmetric equilibria. Part (ii) of the proposition expresses the
providerssalary and the price charged on the consumersside as functions of the fee-
for-service. This is possible because with a redundant system of rst-order conditions,
we can arbitrarily set one of the variables. Equations (32) and (33) show that the fee-
for-service paid to providers reduces both the price charged to consumers and the xed
salary paid to providers. Indeed, the fee-for-service allows platforms to internalize the
positive component generated by providers in the formation of CNE and therefore to
reduce the rents the providers get in equilibrium.
Substituting the equilibrium prices into the platforms prot dened in (28) and
rearranging establishes the following proposition.
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Proposition 8 In a symmetric equilibrium, platformsprots are given by
j =
1
2
 
P j   cj  mwj

;
=
1
2

tA +mtB   (m+ ) (gA +mgB)
2

: (34)
Consequently platformsprots do not depend on the level of cj on which the equilib-
rium prices are conditioned.
This property is in stark contrast to Armstrongs (2006) ndings. Recall that in Arm-
strongs setting, platformsprots are increasing (competition intensityis decreasing)
in the usage fee. This is because platforms use usage fee to reduce the cross-group net-
work e¤ects. In the current model, externalities and tari¤s are of a di¤erent nature
and it turns out that with our CNE, an increase in the fee-for-service does not reduce
competition intensity. Another consequence of this nding is that when one of the two
remuneration schemes is regulated, platformsprots do not depend on the regulated
level. This result qualies Wrights (2004) assessment that any regulatory policy will
a¤ect competition intensity in a two-sided framework (see fallacy 8, p.51).
Corollary 2 The level of a regulated fee-for-service (resp. wages) does not a¤ect com-
petition intensity when the platforms strategically set their level of wages (resp. fee-for-
service).
6 Examples and illustrations
To illustrate the results and provide some additional insight, we shall now present the
full analytical solutions (under the two types of payment schemes) for three special cases
and give a numerical illustration for one of them. First, we consider the case where the
externality simply depends on the ratio between membership on both sides (so that f
is homogenous of degree zero). Then we consider a setting with di¤erent degrees of
homogeneity. Finally, we provide an example for the non homogenous case.
When qj =

mnBj =n
A
j

, the common network externality is homogeneous of degree
zero. When providers receive a salary, Proposition 1 implies that equilibrium prices are
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given by
P j = tA + 2 ( +m) m
;
wj =  tB + 2 ( +m) m 1:
With this price structure, it is clear that platforms only transfer rents from consumers
to providers and have equilibrium prots independent of the network externalities.
To conrm this, note that with this specication (20) reduces to
j =
1
2
(tA +mtB) , j = 1; 2;
which does not depend on  or . It is worth noticing that (as discussed in the in-
troduction) this functional form (with quality depending on the ratio), has interesting
applications for education and heath care sectors.16
To illustrate this case numerically, we consider the following parametersvalues: tA
= 0:3; tB = 0:4;  = 0:3;  = 0:5;m = 0:05 and  = 1. The symmetric equilibrium
leads to Pi = 0:3325 and wi = 0:25 with a level of prot i = 0:16. The following gure
represents the prot function of rm 1 as a function of admissible17 P1 and w1 evaluated
at symmetric equilibrium prices P2 = 0:3325 and w2 = 0:25. One can see that the
symmetric equilibrium constitutes e¤ectively a global best reply for platform 1 (and thus
by symmetry for platform 2). Though of limited scope this observation is interesting.
As usual in two-sided market models, second-order conditions are quite complex in our
setting. The example shows that at least for a simple nonlinear specication of f , the
existence of the equilibrium is not a problem.
We now turn to the more general case where f is specied by (1) so that the CNE
is homogenous of degree k =    . The nice feature about this specication is that
it shows that negative levels of k do not have to be ruled out. Under a salary scheme,
16Under a fee-for-service scheme, we obtain
cj =  mtB
2
+ m (m+ ) ;
P j =
mtB
2
+ tA + ( + m) m
;
which in accordance with the general results yields a prot of j = 

j .
17By admissible, we mean that the demands lie between 0 and 1 and that prots are positive.
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Figure 1: Prot function of platform 1 (when prices of platform 2 are set at their
equilibrium levels).
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equilibrium prices and prot levels are given by (j = 1; 2)
P j = tA +

1
2
  1
m ( +m) ; (35)
wj =  tB  

1
2
  1
m 1 ( +m) ; (36)
j =
1
2
(tA +mtB) 

1
2
 
m ( +m) (   ) : (37)
Not surprisingly, network externalities a¤ect prots according to the sign of k =    .
When  > , quality o¤ered by the platforms are relatively more sensitive to the number
of consumers than to the number of providers. Therefore, platforms can charge a higher
relative price on the consumersside for the quality provided without transferring all
the network externalities rents to the providers (negative global externality).
Finally, let us consider a case where the homogeneity property does not hold at
all. For instance, think about a case where quality depends positively on the ratio
mnBj =n
A
j

but also depends positively on the volumeof consumers treated by the
provider18. In such a case, we have qj =

mnBj =n
A
j

+ dnAj with d > 0 small enough to
ensure that we continue to have a negative intra-group externality on the consumers
side. Equilibrium prices, wages and prots are now given by
P j = tA + 2 ( +m)

m  d
2

;
wj =  tB + 2 ( +m) (m) ;
j =
1
2
(tA +mtB)  ( +m) d:
Recall that because of the parameter d (which reduces the intensity of the negative
intra-group externality on the consumersside) the common network externality does
not satisfy the homogeneity property. Consequently, the impact on prices and prots is
more complex. With the considered specication, platformsprot are reduced because
they charge a lower price on the consumersside. This lower price is not outweighed by
a lower wage paid on the providersside.
18This assumption makes sense for a hospital. The quality of care can depend on the volume of
patients treated.
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7 Conclusion
This paper has examined a market in which two platforms compete for consumers and for
providers in the presence of a common network externality. For a given price structure,
consumers and providers value the same index of quality (albeit possibly with di¤erent
intensities). This index depends positively on the number of providers, but negatively
on the number of consumers. We have shown that the symmetric equilibrium has some
specic properties. First, the common network externality has a cumulative e¤ect on
prices: its e¤ect on one sides price is, partially or entirely, shifted to the other side of
the market. Second, when the quality index is specied by a homogenous function, the
sign of the homogeneitys degree determines the net impact of the externality, (i), on
prices on both sides of the market and, (ii), on competition intensity. In the specic,
but empirically appealing case where the homogeneitys degree is equal to zero, the
presence of the common network externality has no impact on equilibrium prots; the
price increase on one side of the market is totally shifted to the other side. We show
that a fee-for-service leads to lower remuneration for providers than a at salary scheme.
This, in turn results in a lower price level so that prots are the same under both
regimes. Finally, we have allowed platforms to combine both remuneration schemes.
As expected, there exists a continuum of symmetric equilibria, parametrized by one of
the prices. However, surprisingly, platformsequilibrium prots do not depend on this
price. In other words, competition intensity does not depend on the way the providers
remuneration schemes mix salaries and fee-for-service. This is a rather strong and
surprising result which is at odds with conclusions obtained for other types of prices
and externalities. Admittedly, the robustness of this strong result must be confronted
to a number of variations and generalizations of the model. In particular, providers
may decide the number of procedures so that both quality and quantity matter. These
features appear to be especially relevant in the health care sector (see for instance Quest
et al., 2008 and Fortin et al., 2008).
Our analysis could also be extended in at least two di¤erent ways. First, it would
be interesting to consider the case where the market is not fully covered (on one or two
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sides). When the severity of their illness is not high enough, some of the potential pa-
tients may decide not to consume medical (hospital) services at all. On the providers
side, some of the physicians may prefer to remain self-employed. A second possible
extension concerns the type of hospitals that compete in the market for patients. For
instance, for-prot providers could coexist with not-for-prot or physicians-owned hos-
pitals. This would admittedly not be a trivial extension because in the case of mixed
oligopolies one can no longer concentrate on symmetric equilibria. These issues are on
our research agenda.
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Appendix
A Uniqueness of demand functions
In the ratio case we have q1 = mnB1 =n
A
1 : From (3), one obtains
g
 
nA1 ;mn
B
1

=
2tB


nB1  
1
2
  w
2tB

;
where w = w1   w2.
Substituting this expression into (2) yields
nA1 =
1
2
+

tA
tB


nB1  
1
2
  w
2tB

  P
2tA
; (38)
where P = P1   P2. It is worth noticing that if nB1 is unique, then nA1 is also unique.
From (3), one has
nB1

1  m
2tB

1
nA1
+
1
1  nA1

=
1
2
+
1
2tB

  m
1  n1A
+w

:
Multiplying both sides of this equality by nA1
 
1  nA1

yields
nB1

nA1
 
1  nA1
  m
2tB

=
1
2

nA1
 
1  nA1
 
1 +
w
tB

  
tB
nA1

:
Substituting (38) from gives nB1 as a solution to a third degree polynomial equation.
Some additional tedious computations show that only one of the three solutions is a
real numbers.19
B Second-order conditions
We provide second order conditions for the case where qj = mnBj   nAj . We rst deal
successively with the salary and the fee-for-service payment schemes.
B.1 Salary scheme
When platforms pay a salary to providers, the symmetric equilibrium is a global maxi-
mum when the matrix H dened by
H =
24 @21@P 21 @21@P1@w1
@21
@P1@w1
@21
@w21
35
19The market share belongs to [0; 1]. If the solution of the polynomial is negative or superior to 1, it
means that we are in presence of a corner solution for the demands levels.
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is semi denite negative i.e. @21=@P 21  0; @21=@w21  0 and detH  0. Di¤erenti-
ating the LHS of (11) and (12) with respect to P1 and w1, the second order conditions
are thus satised if:
@21
@P 21
= 2
@nA1
@P1
 0; (39)
@21
@w21
=  2m@n
B
1
@w1
 0; (40)
detH =
@21
@P 21
@21
@w21
 

@nA1
@w1
 m@n
B
1
@P1
2
 0: (41)
According to (5) and (8), (39) and (40) are satised. Substituting (5)(8) into the LHS
of (41) yields
detH =  4m@n
A
1
@P1
@nB1
@w1
 

@nA1
@w1
 m@n
B
1
@P1
2
=
4 (2tB   m) (2tA + ) m [   ]2
(4tAtB	)
2 ; (42)
so that (41) is satised if
(2tB   m) (2tA + )  m
4
[   ]2 :
B.2 Fee-for-service scheme
When platforms use a fee for service scheme, the symmetric equilibrium is a global
maximum when the matrix Z dened by
Z =
24 @21@P 21 @21@P1@c1
@21
@P1@c1
@21
@c21
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is denite negative i.e. @21=@P 21  0; @21=@c21  0 and detZ  0. Di¤erentiating the
LHS of (24) and (25) with respect to P1 and c1 show that the second-order conditions
are satised if
@21
@P 21
= 2
@nA1
@P1
 0; (43)
@21
@c21
=  2@n
A
1
@c1
+
@2nA1
@c21
(P1   c1)  0; (44)
@21
@P1@c1
=
@21
@P 21
@21
@c21
 

@nA1
@c1
  @n
A
1
@P1
2
 0: (45)
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Di¤erentiating (9) with respect to c1 yields
@2nA1
@c21
=   
4m (tAtB)
2	2
[2tA +  (1 m)] :
According to (5) and (8), (43) and (44) are fullled provided that 2tA +  (1 m) > 0
and that prots are positive. Introducing (9) and (5) in (44), simplifying and rearranging
allows us to observe that (45) is fullled if and only if

 
2tB   m+ 4cm

(2tA +  (1 m)) (P1   c1)
mtAtB	
 1
2

   m  2tB + 4c
m
2
:
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